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Measuring the Impact of the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill on Consumer Behavior
O. Ashton Morgan, John C. Whitehead, William L. Huth,
Greg S. Martin, and Richard Sjolander
ABSTRACT. We exploit the timing of the BP Deep-
water Horizon oil spill to develop a unique dataset of
oyster consumer actual and anticipated behavior im-
mediately prior to and following the event. A revealed
and stated preference model allows both short- and
longer-term responses to the spill to be investigated.
Findings indicate that the BP spill had a negative
impact on oyster demand in terms of short-run actual
behavior, although spill effects show signs of dissi-
pating several months following the spill. By account-
ing for unobserved heterogeneity in the sample, find-
ings further indicate that short- and longer-term spill
responses differ across consumer groups. (JEL Q22,
Q51)
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, there was an explosion
and fire on the BP-licensed drilling rig Deep-
water Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico. While
the Deepwater Horizon rig sunk two days
later, the seafloor oil gusher that resulted from
the explosion continued to leak until the well-
head was finally capped on July 15, 2010. The
Deepwater Horizon spill was 20 times the size
of the Exxon Valdez spill and sent approxi-
mately 4.9 million barrels of crude oil into the
Gulf of Mexico over a 3 month period. The
spill had a negative impact on the Gulf of
Mexico fishery. Following the spill, the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) closed recreational and com-
mercial fishing in affected federal waters
between the mouth of the Mississippi River
and Pensacola Bay, Florida. This closure ini-
tially incorporated 6,814 mi2 (17,650 km2) of
Gulf waters. By late June, NOAA had in-
creased the area under closure over a dozen
times. At its peak, 88,522 mi2, or 37% of fed-
eral waters, was closed to recreational and
commercial fishing in the Gulf.1
Due to concerns over potential health risks
associated with consumption of contaminated
seafood, the federal government also declared
a fisheries disaster for Louisiana, Alabama,
and Mississippi. Producing almost two-thirds
of all oysters consumed in the United States,
oysters harvested from the Gulf of Mexico
(eastern oysters) are an economically impor-
tant commercial fish species for both produc-
ers and consumers. For producers, between
2001 and 2010, annual landings of Gulf oys-
ters ranged from 16 million to 27 million
pounds. Ex-vessel revenue ranged from $61
million to $75 million (2010 dollars), ac-
counting for about 10% of total ex-vessel rev-
enue generated by Gulf of Mexico fisheries.2
With the flow of oil breaching oyster beds,
there were serious concerns that the oil could
get into the food chain; a concern that was
exacerbated by the use of chemical disper-
sants that were applied to accelerate the dis-
persal process. Specifically, the use of disper-
1 Details of the spill impacts can be retrieved from
www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20110419_gulf
reopening.html.
2 These data were retrieved from NOAA Fisheries, Fish-
eries Statistics Division (www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/commer-
cial-fisheries/index).
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sants can break up the oil into droplets small
enough to enter the food chain. Testing found
traces of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs) that are directly linked to oil spills and
contain carcinogens in Louisiana coastal wa-
ters. PAHs can have serious negative human
health effects if they enter the food chain (typ-
ically through plankton, finfish, or shellfish),
and tests found that levels were 40 times
higher than before the spill.3 Posing an addi-
tional potential health risk, researchers also
believe that the growth of Vibrio vulnificus
bacteria can be spurred by oil and contami-
nants from the spill.4 V. vulnificus is a gram-
negative bacterium found naturally in coastal
waters along the Gulf, Atlantic, and Pacific
coasts, although it is most widespread in the
warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Along
with V. cholera, V. vulnificus is considered to
be more lethal than the remainder of the vib-
rios, inhabiting brackish and saltwater, and is
found in higher concentrations in summer
months when coastal waters are warm.5 Each
year in the United States, approximately 100
individuals become seriously ill (typically by
contracting primary septicemia or gastroen-
teritis) from consuming raw Gulf of Mexico
oysters, of which about 35% die from the in-
fection (Scallan et al. 2011). Combined, the
direct risk impacts from PAHs entering the
food chain and indirect effects on V. vulnificus
growth may heighten risk perceptions and in-
fluence consumer demand for oysters, as a re-
sult of the spill. Following the spill, all Loui-
siana oyster harvest areas were closed. Over
the course of the year following the spill, sec-
tions of the fishing closures were incremen-
tally lifted on several occasions. Exactly one
year to the day of the spill, NOAA reopened
the final 1,041 mi2 of Gulf waters immediately
surrounding the Deepwater Horizon well-
head.
In general, studies analyzing the effects of
contamination incidents or harvesting bans on
3 Ex-vessel revenue is the quantity of oysters harvested
by commercial oyster farmers, multiplied by the average
price received by them at the first point of sale.
4 See www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/30/us-oil-spill-
carcinogens-idUSTRE68T6FS20100930.
5 See www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/07/will-oil-
eating-bacteria-plague-the-gulf/.
consumer behavior consistently illustrate that,
not surprisingly, news of the incident raises
risk perceptions and reduces consumer de-
mand for the product, at least in the short term
(Swartz and Strand 1981; Smith, van Raven-
swaay, and Thompson 1988; Brown and
Schrader 1990; Wessells, Millers, and Brooks
1995). These studies use either market-based
data or stated preference methods. Using mar-
ket data, Swartz and Strand (1981) and Smith,
van Ravenswaay, and Thompson (1988) find
the postcontamination decline in demand to
be short-lived, with the strongest decreases in
consumption in the month following the in-
cident, but with consumption returning to its
previous level 2 months after the event. The
principle constraint of using market data is
that examining the effect that news of the
event has on consumer behavior requires re-
searchers to create a scaled information vari-
able as a proxy for the provision of media in-
formation. The information variable is created
in an attempt to account for the total effect of
the contamination or harvesting ban incident.
However, to what degree these researcher-cre-
ated variables accurately capture the infor-
mation effect is debatable. To provide some
examples, Wessells, Millers, and Brooks
(1995) analyze the effects that news of toxic
algae contamination has on mussel demand in
Montreal by including a scaled media infor-
mation variable equal to the weekly number
of negative articles appearing in a local news-
paper. Swartz and Strand (1981) analyze how
news of oyster bed closures in the James River
in Virginia due to kepone contamination im-
pact oyster consumer behavior in the Balti-
more area. They include an information vector
based on the level of newspaper coverage and
the likelihood that it negatively influences
oyster consumption. Smith, van Ravenswaay,
and Thompson (1988) also use an information
dummy in their model of sales losses follow-
ing a milk ban in Hawaii, although they ac-
knowledge potential issues, suggesting that
the dummy “is a crude proxy” to capture the
information effects, and “it may be more use-
ful to consider more accurate ways of repre-
senting diffusion of information about a con-
tamination incident” (p. 13).
Revealed and stated preference (RP/SP)
methods can avoid the problem of capturing
the media information effect by disseminating
specific risk information across respondents.
The effects of the information treatment on
expected consumer behavior can then be iso-
lated.6 Parsons et al. (2006), Morgan, Martin,
and Huth (2009), and Morgan et al. (2013)
survey consumers and use RP/SP methods to
examine the effects of consumer health-risk
information on seafood consumer behavior.
They provide respondents with hypothetical
health-risk information based on actual media
coverage and examine their behavioral re-
sponses. Results from these studies all suggest
that consumption risk information raises risk
perceptions and causes a decrease in demand.
In a study that specifically considers oil spill
impacts, Wessells and Anderson (1995) sur-
vey 156 Rhode Island households to examine
factors affecting seafood consumption behav-
ior and seafood safety perceptions. Using a
recursive system of equations that describes
the influence of seafood safety perceptions on
expected demand, they find that consumers
anticipate a decrease in seafood consumption
if faced with hypothetical negative informa-
tion regarding an oil spill and closure of the
Naragansett Bay to fishing. However, while
stated preference methods provide a means to
directly measure the impact of contamination
information on behavior, a common drawback
is that these analyses are typically confined to
examining short-term and arguably height-
ened consumer reactions to an event, as con-
sumers’ consumption changes are elicited
immediately following exposure to an infor-
mation treatment. In this research, due to the
timing of the spill, we develop a pre- and
postspill RP/SP framework that models indi-
viduals’ actual and expected oyster consump-
tion behavior over the spill period. The unique
dataset and modeling approach enables the
impact of the spill on oyster consumers’ risk
perceptions and, in turn, consumption behav-
ior, to be analyzed in both the short and longer
terms. We provide a timely contribution to the
body of literature examining the impacts of
contamination events on consumer behavior,
6 Higher temperature-based concentrations of V. vulni-
ficus between May and August is one reason for the common
adage among raw oyster consumers to “eat oysters only dur-
ing the ‘R’ months.”
especially after an event of the magnitude of
the BP spill. Specifically, we survey oyster
consumers on their actual and expected oyster
consumption choices in March and April
2010, collecting the last observation on the
morning of the Deepwater Horizon explosion.
We then resample a portion of these respon-
dents after the spill to again elicit actual and
anticipated consumption behavior. A pre- and
postspill RP/SP model framework is devel-
oped to measure oyster consumers’ responses
to a major spill event, and associated changes
in individual and aggregate welfare. Our find-
ings extend any previous research in this area
that we are aware of by taking advantage of
the timing of the spill to examine the impacts
of the spill on both short-term actual con-
sumption behavior and longer-term antici-
pated behavior. As such, we focus solely on
demand-side impacts resulting from the spill
and do not consider any changes to producer
surplus. Results from pre- and postspill RP/
SP measures show that, as expected, the spill
has a negative impact on short-term actual de-
mand by the average respondent. This creates
aggregate welfare losses in the region of $4
million. However, the negative spill effects
dissipate over the longer-term horizon as an-
ticipated consumption begins to return toward
prespill levels. We also consider the impact of
the remaining oyster harvesting ban length on
behavior. We find that the longer the period
between respondents’ expectations regarding
the length of the ban and its actual duration,
the greater the reduction in oyster consump-
tion.
To provide a deeper analysis into consum-
ers’ behavioral responses, we also incorporate
unobserved heterogeneity into the RP/SP
framework by estimating a latent class model.
The latent class model investigates whether
actual and expected behavior of different
classes of consumer varies due to the spill.
II. SURVEY, SAMPLING, AND STUDY
DESIGN
We developed an Internet-based survey of
oyster consumers (aged 18 and over), sampled
from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control–
designated “case states.”7 These are Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and
California.8 The online survey was adminis-
tered by Online Survey Solutions, Inc. (OSS),
and the survey was administered between
March and April 2010. The last observation
for Survey 1 was collected on April 20, 2010,
the day of the BP Deepwater Horizon explo-
sion, but before any public announcement re-
garding a spill was made. The purpose of the
first survey is to gather data on oyster consum-
ers’ attitudes, preferences, awareness and per-
ceptions of oyster consumption health risk,
knowledge about oyster consumption health
risk. and relevant demographic data. Also, to
meet our initial research objectives, respon-
dents were asked a series of stated preference
questions. These questions were designed to
elicit consumption behavior under existing
conditions and after being provided with dif-
ferent educational information treatments and
information on postharvest processing meth-
ods. Usable observations from 1,849 oyster
consumers were collected.9 We now refer to
this survey as the prespill survey.
By survey design, respondents from the
prespill survey were first asked about their
current annual consumption frequency to gen-
erate pretreatment baseline data for oyster
consumption experience (revealed prefer-
ence). To aid the respondents in determining
the annual amount, they were asked how
7 Both RP data and SP data have their individual
strengths and weaknesses. The major drawback of the RP
method is that analyzing changes in behavior may not be
feasible because individuals may not be able to form pref-
erences due to lack of an actual experience. The major
strength of RP data is that it is based on actual behavior
(although this may be constrained by individuals’ ability to
accurately recall past behavior). SP methods are constrained
by their hypothetical approach but benefit from their flexi-
bility. Overall, the strengths of both approaches can be ex-
ploited through joint estimation of RP and SP data. Essen-
tially, joint estimation has the advantage of allowing the
measurement of preferences outside of an individual’s his-
torical experience while anchoring the stated preference re-
sponses to actual behavior (Rosenberg and Loomis 1999;
Grijalva et al. 2002; Whitehead 2005; Egan and Herriges
2006).
8 U.S. Centers for Disease Control case states are states
in which there are documented cases of V. vulnificus–related
deaths.
9 Due to a request from Georgia Sea Grant, we also sam-
pled consumers from that state.
many months in a year they typically con-
sumed an oyster meal, and then, in a typical
month in which they ate oyster meals, about
how many oyster meals they ate.10 The survey
software then computed the annual number of
meals, and respondents were offered the op-
portunity to adjust the number if desired. Re-
sponses to this question represent the prespill
revealed preference annual number of oyster
meals consumed (RP1). Next, respondents
were asked whether, compared to the number
of meals they revealed they consumed in a
typical year, they expected to eat more, less,
or the same number of oyster meals in the next
year. Respondents were then prompted to state
how many more or less as required (stated
preference). In estimation, inclusion of a
stated preference count under existing condi-
tions provides a means to control for potential
hypothetical bias in individual responses
(Whitehead et al. 2008). Responses represent
a prespill stated preference meal count (SP1).
Finally, in order to derive an oyster demand
curve, respondents were also asked to state
whether they would eat more, less, or the
same number of meals under both a price in-
crease and a price decrease scenario (while
being informed that the price of all other food
products remained the same), where the price
changes were varied randomly across respon-
dents. Each respondent received a price in-
crease of $1, $3, $5, or $7, or a price decrease
of $1, $2, $3, or $4.
With the timing of the prespill survey and
the BP spill, we developed a follow-up survey
designed to elicit individuals’ attitudes re-
garding the spill, seafood safety concerns, ex-
pectations regarding the length of the oyster
harvest ban in Louisiana, and stated prefer-
ence consumption based on expected ban
length. We refer to this as the postspill survey.
The online postspill survey was again admin-
istered by OSS in November/December 2010
(7 to 8 months following the spill). As part of
this effort, we resampled some of the respon-
dents from the prespill Survey 1. In total, the
postspill survey collected 1,087 observations,
of which, 504 respondents had also answered
10 A more in-depth discussion of the prespill survey is
detailed by Morgan et al. (2013).
the prespill survey. In total, there were 382
usable responses from oyster consumers that
completed all the prespill and postspill RP/SP
elements from both surveys.11
In the postspill survey, we asked respon-
dents the same four RP/SP questions as de-
scribed in Survey 1. Again we asked respon-
dents about their actual and expected annual
oyster meals consumed (which we refer to as
RP2 and SP2, respectively) plus stated pref-
erence price increase and decrease scenarios.
Combined, the pre- and postspill RP/SP ques-
tions enable an investigation into the short-
and longer-term effects of the spill on oyster
consumer behavior.12 It should be highlighted
that there is an overlap between pre- and
postspill periods. For example, as the postspill
survey was administered approximately 8
months after the spill, RP2 data overlap with
SP1 data for a period of 4 months. This likely
impacts coefficient estimates. To examine
this, Whitehead, Morgan and Huth (2013) an-
alyze the predictive validity of the before/after
data and controlling for the overlap in pre- and
postspill time periods. They find that there are
small forecast improvements in revealed pref-
erence oyster meals using the stated prefer-
ence oyster meals relative to the revealed pref-
erence oyster meals from the first survey.
In addition, following the spill, a ban on
harvesting oysters from Louisiana oyster beds
was mandated. At the time of the postspill sur-
vey, the ban remained in place for approxi-
mately 50% of Louisiana oyster beds. We
were interested in examining, not only how a
partial ban on oyster harvesting impacted con-
sumer behavior, but to investigate how the
length of the existing ban relative to individ-
uals’ expectations impacted consumption be-
havior. To accomplish this, we asked a further
SP question under an oyster harvesting ban
scenario. Under this scenario respondents
11 Respondents were informed that oyster meals in-
cluded any meal in which the main course was oysters, or
oysters were an important ingredient in the dish (like
gumbo), or meals in which there was an oyster appetizer.
Pictures were also displayed to provide examples of oyster
meals.
12 It is worthwhile noting, therefore, that in our RP/SP
design, we focus on current and past oyster consumers, and
not potential consumers.
were informed that the State of Louisiana
Health and Hospitals “closed” several Loui-
siana shellfish harvest areas to the harvest of
oysters and other molluscan shellfish. While
some shellfish harvest areas had since re-
opened, the ban on oyster harvesting from
many of Louisiana’s shellfish harvest areas re-
mained in place. Respondents were then
asked how long they expected the ban to last,
from a list of seven possible durations
(1 = Not much longer; 2 = About a month;
3 = About 3 months; 4 = About 6 months;
5 = About 9 months; 6 = About a year; and
7 = More than a year). Next, respondents were
told to imagine that the Louisiana ban on har-
vesting oysters from affected areas would last
for about another [number], where [number]
was randomly assigned and varied across re-
spondents from a list of four possible values,
namely, “month,” “3 months,” “6 months,” or
“9 months.” Respondents were then asked:
“Suppose that the average price of your oyster
meals stays the same, compared to the number
of oyster meals you previously told us you
expect to eat next year. Do you think you will
eat more, less, or about the same number of
oyster meals next year?” Again, respondents
were prompted to state how many more or
less, as required.
Table 1 defines all pre- and postspill RP/
SP scenarios and provides descriptive statis-
tics for meal counts elicited under each sce-
nario plus under each expected ban length
treatment. Table 2 provides sample definitions
and descriptive statistics for variables used in
the analysis for the sample. The majority of
respondents were female (53%) and Cauca-
sian (79%) with an average sample age of 47
years and earning an average household in-
come of $73,500. Less than half of respon-
dents believed that Gulf oysters were safe to
eat following the spill. Approximately 68% of
respondents consumed raw oysters and 17%
were immune-compromised, as they indicated
that they have one of the health conditions
necessary to be vulnerable to a V. vulnificus
infection (e.g., diabetes, liver disease, iron
overload disease, stomach disorders, and
HIV).
TABLE 1
Pre- and Postspill Revealed and Stated Preference (RP/SP), and Ban Length Scenario Meal Count Statistics
SP Scenario Description
Mean Meal
Count Std. Dev.
Prespill Survey
RP1 Observed annual number of oyster meals consumed 21.9 45.8
SP1 Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed 22.3 46.4
SP1 Price Increase Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed with price increase 18.6 41.6
SP1 Price Decrease Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed with price decrease 25.1 49.1
Postspill Survey
RP2 Observed annual number of oyster meals consumed 17.5 38.9
SP2 Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed 18.3 42.3
SP2 Price Increase Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed with price increase 16.7 43.3
SP2 Price Decrease Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed with price decrease 20.6 44.4
SP2 Ban Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed with 1, 3, 6, or 9
month ban
18.3 43.1
Ban Length
1 month Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed if spill lasts for
about 1 more month
15.7 36.2
3 months Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed if spill lasts for
about 3 more months
19.1 42.9
6 months Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed if spill lasts for
about 6 more months
22.2 51.9
9 months Expected annual number of oyster meals consumed if spill lasts for
about 9 more months
16.3 41.4
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PRICE Change in price of oyster meals 1.02 2.24 −5.00 6.00
QUANTITY Average annual oyster meals consumed 19.92 43.99 0.00 380.00
AGE Age of respondent 47.46 17.76 18.00 89.00
GENDER Respondent is male ( = 1) 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
RACE Respondent is Caucasian ( = 1) 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
INC Household income of respondent (thousands of dollars) 73.51 38.39 8.00 150.00
RP1 Revealed preference question from the prespill survey
( = 1)
0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
RP2 Revealed preference question from the postspill survey 1
( = 1)
0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
SP1 Stated preference question from the prespill survey ( = 1) 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
SP2 Stated preference question from the postspill survey 1
( = 1)
0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
RAW Consumes raw oysters ( = 1) 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
BAN_LENGTH How much longer respondents expect ban to last (1 = Not
much longer; 2 = About a month; 3 = About 3 months;
4 = About 6 months; 5 = About 9 months; 6 = About a
year; 7 = More than a year)
4.86 2.05 1.00 7.00
BAN Stated remaining length of Louisiana harvesting ban
(1 = About a month; 2 = About 3 months; 3 = About 6
months; 4 = About 9 months)
2.41 1.16 1.00 4.00
BAN_DIFF Difference between BAN_LENGTH and BAN 1.45 2.42 −4.00 5.00
AT-RISK Consumer is vulnerable to V. vulnificus infection ( = 1) 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
III. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Both pre- and postspill RP/SP data for a
model of oyster consumer consumption be-
havior were collected via an online survey in-
strument. Pre- and postspill RP data were
based on the actual annual number of oyster
meals consumed. Pre- and postspill SP data
were used to stimulate an expected change in
oyster meals consumed resulting from price
changes and a ban on Louisiana oyster har-
vesting due to the BP spill. Specifically, SP
questions were asked about future meals con-
sumed: (1) under prespill existing conditions,
(2) with a prespill price increase and decrease
scenario, (3) under postspill existing condi-
tions, (4) with a postspill price increase and
decrease scenario, and (5) with a postspill ban
on Louisiana oyster harvesting continuing for
another month to 9 months.
One issue that needed to be addressed was
that in the prespill survey framework, respon-
dents’ baseline meal prices were not elicited.
This was because previous research had
shown that it makes little difference in esti-
mation whether the full meal price or a ran-
domly assigned change in price is used as an
independent variable in RP/SP demand mod-
els (Parsons et al. 2006; Haab et al. 2010).
Unfortunately, this therefore meant that we
were not able to estimate a change in oyster
meal price as a result of the spill. The lack of
an adequate measure of how the spill im-
pacted meal prices would therefore constrain
any meaningful welfare analyses involving
pre- and postspill data. To address this, we
separately estimated a change in oyster meal
prices due to the spill and imputed the after-
spill price change into the model. To do this,
the change in postspill price was analyzed by
obtaining baseline price data before and after
the spill from the National Marine Fisheries
Service. A model of Eastern oyster ex-vessel
prices was then developed:
xp = α+βQ +γS +δM + ϕY +θBP, [1]
where xp is the ex-vessel price per pound, Q
is pounds landed, S is a vector of dummy vari-
ables for the state, M is the month, Y is the
year, and BP is a dummy variable equal to 1
during months when the oil spill affected the
oyster harvest (we use May–December 2010).
Results from a random effects panel model on
ex-vessel prices indicated that the BP oil spill
caused a supply shock that increased oyster
prices in 2010, but prices then fell back to
prespill levels in 2011. Assuming that the
price of an Eastern oyster meal in a state is
proportional to the ex-vessel price, and ad-
justing for various markup factors, we esti-
mated that the mean increase in oyster meals
due to the BP oil spill was approximately $2
per meal.13
As the dependent variable, actual and ex-
pected meal counts is a nonnegative integer
with a high frequency of low meals con-
sumed, a count panel data model is estimated:
−λ xit ite λit
Pr(x ) = , x . [2]it it = 0,1,2, . . .
x !it
The natural log of the mean number of
meals is assumed to be a linear function of
prices, sociodemographic indicators, con-
sumption behavior and health characteristics,
and a ban scenario scaled variable. To allow
for variation across oyster consumers that
cannot be explained by the independent vari-
ables, we assume that the mean number of
meals also depends on a random error, ui. The
RP/SP Poisson demand model is
lnλ = β +β P +β y +β s +β c +β RP2it 0 1 i 2 i 3 4 i 5
+β SP1+β SP2+β BAN_DIFF +μ , [3]6 7 8 i
where P is the change in price of an oyster
meal; y is income; s is a vector of sociode-
mographic variables; c is a vector of individ-
ual consumption and health characteristics;
individuals are indexed i = 1, . . . , 382; and
t = 1, . . . , 9 denotes annual oyster meal de-
mand under a prespill RP status quo treat-
ment, postspill RP status quo, prespill SP
status quo, postspill SP status quo, prespill SP
price increase, prespill SP price decrease,
postspill SP price increase, postspill SP price
decrease, and a postspill SP information treat-
ment on a Louisiana oyster harvesting ban in
the pseudo-panel data. The scaled dummy
13 Full details of the ex-vessel price model are available
upon request.
variable BAN_DIFF (BAN_DIFF = 1 when
t = 9) captures the temporal difference be-
tween respondents’ expected ban horizon and
the actual ban horizon (the duration of which
they are informed of in the ban treatment).
SP = 1 for hypothetical meal data (t = 3, . . . , 9)
and 0 for revealed meal data (t = 1 and 2). β0
through β8 are coefficients to be estimated in
the model. Pooling the data suggests that
panel data methods be used to account for dif-
ferences in variance across sample individ-
uals, i, and scenarios, t. The distribution of
meals conditioned on ui is Poisson with con-
ditional mean and variance, λit. If exp(λit) is
assumed to follow a gamma distribution, then
the unconditional meals, xit, follow a negative
binomial distribution (Hausman, Hall, and
Griliches 1984). The random effects Poisson
model imposes positive correlation across the
t scenarios (Landry and Liu 2011).
With the semilog functional form, the base-
line economic benefit per annual oyster meals
consumed for the representative consumer as
measured by average annual per-person con-
sumer surplus (CS) is
x̂
CS = , [4]
− (β )1
where is the annual number of predictedx̂
meals for the representative oyster consumer
and all independent variables are set at sample
means (Bockstael and Strand 1987). The
short-run change in annual per-person con-
sumer surplus as a result of the spill is rep-
resented by
(x̂)− (x′)
CS = , [5]
− (β )1
where and represent pre- and postspillx̂ x′,
actual meal counts. The long-run consumer
surplus effects due to the spill are estimated
in a similar fashion with the appropriate RP/
SP meal counts.
There is a developing body of literature in
economics that examines preference hetero-
geneity in individuals’ behavior. We follow
these studies by developing a finite mixture,
or latent class model, that allows behavioral
responses to the health-risk information treat-
ments to be examined across classes of con-
sumer. We then compare results from the stan-
dard pooled RP/SP model to the latent class
model findings. Formally, the latent class
model is described by an individual consumer
who resides in a latent class, c. The individual
class membership (denoted by = 1, . . . , n)∗Ci
is unknown (latent) to the researcher. The un-
derlying utility of individual i’s consumption
x, under information treatment t, given that the
individual belongs to latent class c, can be ex-
pressed as
U = β′X + ε , [6]ixt c ixt ixt
where is an independent identically dis-εixt
tributed (i.i.d) error term (from the analyst’s
perspective) and indicates the unobserved het-
erogeneity for individual i’s consumption x,
under information treatment t, and is a′βc
class-specific vector of parameters to be esti-
mated from the observed attribute vector,
.Xixt
For each class, the actual number of annual
meals consumed, xi, is assumed to be drawn
from a Poisson distribution. Within each class,
the underlying parameters of the Poisson dis-
tribution are allowed to vary. Specifically, we
assume that
mexp(−λ )λic ic∗ ∗Pr(y = m⎪C = c) =i i
m!
i = 1, . . . ,I:c = 1, . . . ,n, [7]
where represents the condi-λ = exp(X′β )ic i c
tional mean number of oyster meals con-
sumed in class c given characteristics Xi and
the parameter vector .βc
IV. RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results from a random
effects Poisson model and a four-class latent
class model. The dependent variable in all
models is the annual number of oyster meals
consumed. The model in the first column is
the random effects Poisson model that as-
sumes a homogenous mean influence of the
spill and other explanatory variables on an-
nual oyster meal demand. Columns (2)
through (5) present the findings from a panel
TABLE 3
Random Effects Poisson RP/SP Model and Latent Class Model
Random Effects
Latent Class Model
Variable Poisson Model Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2 Latent Class 3 Latent Class 4
CONSTANT 2.764***
(0.239)
4.268***
(0.027)
2.531***
(0.031)
1.052***
(0.074)
1.510***
(0.044)
PRICE −0.052***
(0.001)
−0.033***
(0.003)
−0.061***
(0.003)
−0.075***
(0.007)
−0.054***
(0.003)
INC −0.002**
(0.001)
−0.005***
(0.001)
−0.001***
(0.000)
−0.001***
(0.000)
0.005***
(0.000)
MALE 0.388***
(0.091)
0.320***
(0.008)
0.232***
(0.008)
0.384***
(0.011)
0.181***
(0.006)
AGE −0.003
(0.004)
−0.026***
(0.000)
0.005***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.020***
(0.000)
RP2 −0.118***
(0.009)
0.221***
(0.033)
−0.668***
(0.054)
0.051
(0.103)
0.763***
(0.052)
SP1 −0.020**
(0.009)
−0.024
(0.033)
−0.026
(0.036)
−0.042
(0.094)
0.003
(0.058)
SP2 −0.065***
(0.007)
0.186***
(0.023)
−0.730***
(0.027)
0.053
(0.072)
0.781***
(0.044)
RAW 0.645***
(0.110)
0.710***
(0.010)
0.238***
(0.008)
0.325***
(0.012)
0.089***
(0.009)
AT-RISK −0.449***
(0.155)
0.237***
(0.012)
−0.238***
(0.011)
0.001
(0.016)
−0.707***
(0.010)
BAN_DIFF −0.022***
(0.001)
−0.036***
(0.008)
−0.004
(0.010)
−0.032**
(0.015)
0.006
(0.005)
Alpha 1.172 0.967 15.659 5.297 9.782
Sample size 382 382 382 382 382
Periods 9 9 9 9 9
Class probabilities 0.128 0.277 0.454 0.140
AIC 137,446.4 28,216.7
BIC 137,514.0 28,530.1
Log-likelihood −68,712.2 −14,057.3
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. AIC (Akaike information criterion) = −2(LLB−P); BIC (Bayesian information crite-
rion) = [(−2×LLB)+ (k× ln(n)].
** Significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.
model that allows for unobserved heteroge-
neity with respect to actual and expected an-
nual meal counts and other explanatory vari-
ables. We refer to this as the latent class
model. We estimated a latent class model with
2, 3, 4, and 5 classes and then compared two
measures of fit first developed by Hurvich and
Tsai (1989). We report the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information cri-
terion (BIC). Scarpa, Thiene, and Tempesta
(2007) describe how these statistics help di-
rect the researcher as to the number of classes
to choose. As the five-class model failed to
converge and the four-class specification had
the lowest score on both criteria across the
remaining models, we report results from this
model only. Also reported in Table 3, the four-
class model specification finds that there is a
13% probability that sampled respondents be-
long to Class 1, 28% to Class 2, 45% to Class
3, and 14% to Class 4.
Per-person, per-meal, and annual per-per-
son consumer surplus measures are presented
in Table 4, together with 95% confidence in-
tervals constructed using a bootstrapping pro-
cedure (Krinsky and Robb 1986). The proce-
dure generates 10,000 random variables from
the distribution of the estimated parameters
and generates 10,000 consumer surplus esti-
mates. The estimates are sorted in ascending
order, and the 95% confidence intervals are
found by dropping the bottom and top 2.5%
of the estimates.
For the average consumer in the sample,
the price coefficient is, as expected, negative
and highly statistically significant, so oyster
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consumer behavior conforms to the law of de-
mand. The price coefficient from the standard
model implies a per-person, per-meal con-
sumer surplus estimate of $19.15, or an annual
per-person estimate of $427.14 Based on our
estimate of 467,000 Gulf of Mexico oyster
consumers, this equates to approximately
$199 million in aggregate welfare for Gulf of
Mexico oyster consumers.15 Once we account
for unobserved heterogeneity in the sample,
the price coefficients in the latent class model
vary across consumers, indicating variation in
consumer welfare across classes. For Class 1,
2, 3, and 4 consumers, per-meal consumer
surplus estimates range from $13.28 to
$30.32.
Parameter estimates for the RP/SP coeffi-
cients examine the effect of the spill on short-
run actual behavior and longer-term expected
behavior. We examine consumers’ short-run
response to the spill in two ways: by compar-
ing postspill actual meal counts (RP2) to both
prespill actual (RP1) and prespill expected
meal counts (SP1). First, the coefficient of
RP2 is negative and statistically significant at
the 1% confidence level, so the actual number
of oyster meals consumed by individuals after
the spill is below prespill actual meal counts.
It is worth noting that as all counts are annual,
this avoids any potential seasonal effects in
oyster-consuming behavior, so we attribute
any change in actual meals consumed solely
to the spill. Also, the coefficient of RP2 is
greater in magnitude than the coefficient of
SP1, so postspill actual demand also falls be-
low prespill expectations, reaffirming that the
14 The baseline level for mean annual expected meal
counts is 21.9. It should be noted that we consider reduced
demand following the spill as a loss in individual welfare,
or an avoidance cost, as first posited by Swartz and Strand
(1981) in their paper, coincidently also examining the effects
of contamination news on oyster demand.
15 Our estimate of 467,000 Gulf of Mexico oyster con-
sumers is based on average annual landings of 22 million
pounds of oysters. With a 100-pound sack containing about
250 oysters and the average oyster meal containing about 6
oysters, this equates to consumers eating about 9.3 million
Gulf of Mexico oyster meals annually. Sampled respondents
indicate they consume an average of 19.9 meals per year
(see Table 2). This implies 467,000 Gulf of Mexico oyster
consumers.
spill reduces short-run demand.16 Combined,
these findings indicate that demand from the
average consumer declines significantly in the
short run following the spill. These measures
imply a loss in per-person, per-meal consumer
surplus of between $8.46 and $9.39, or be-
tween $4.0 and $4.4 million in aggregate an-
nual welfare.17
The latent class model highlights hetero-
geneity in the data with regard to short-term
actual spill responses. While Class 2 consum-
ers behave in line with an average consumer,
reducing short-run demand in response to
news of the spill, Class 3 consumers are in-
sensitive to spill news, indicating no change
in oyster demand. Conversely, both Class 1
and 4 consumers increase oyster consumption
once news of the spill is disseminated. Some
possible explanations for this behavioral re-
sponse are that perhaps these consumers do
not perceive any negative health effects per-
taining to the spill, or that they are more sym-
pathetic to the oyster industry and so are ex-
pressing a sense of support for the industry by
increasing oyster demand following the event.
For the Class 1 group in particular, another
possibility is that they may be generally less
risk averse than the average consumer. This
notion is perhaps supported by the positive
and significant coefficient on the AT-RISK pa-
rameter. Recall, immune-compromised con-
sumers are vulnerable to morbidity and mor-
tality risk from consuming Gulf oysters due
to the potential presence of V. vulnificus bac-
teria. While the average at-risk consumer eats
fewer oyster meals than a nonvulnerable con-
sumer, vulnerable Class 1 consumers con-
sume more meals, suggesting a degree of risk
insensitivity in oyster consumption.
For longer-term impacts associated with
the spill, again two comparisons are impor-
tant. First, we examine whether the number of
16 We also assume that time-variant factors that we do
not control for (such as income) do not impact demand over
this period. However, we believe that this is a strong and
valid assumption based on the relatively short time frame of
the analyzed impacts and the relatively anemic economic
conditions at the time.
17 A Wald test (W = 0.098 with probability value = 0.00)
indicates that the difference between prespill expected meals
and postspill and actual meals (SP1 and RP2) is statistically
different from zero.
oyster meals consumers expect to eat after the
spill differs statistically from prespill expec-
tations. We compare a restricted model
(SP = SP1 + SP2) with the standard, unre-
stricted model that allows pre- and postspill
stated preference counts, under existing con-
ditions, to vary. A likelihood ratio test sug-
gests a greater than 95% probability that the
two models are significantly different, so for
the average consumer, expected meal counts
elicited after the spill are significantly differ-
ent from those elicited before the spill. As the
coefficient of SP2 is greater in absolute terms
than the coefficient of SP1, the spill also has
a long-term impact of reducing expected de-
mand.18 However, by comparing RP2 and SP2
coefficients 8 months after the spill, it appears
that the long-term negative responses to the
spill are tempered and demand begins to in-
crease with time. That is, we see a rebound in
oyster demand as consumers indicate that they
anticipate consuming more oyster meals in the
future than they did in the few months follow-
ing the spill.19 Over time, demand is moving
back toward its prespill baseline and welfare
losses are mitigated. There may be several
causes driving this effect; however, we sus-
pect that the principle factor is that individuals
perceive that the negative effects of the spill
lessen over time (and water quality conditions
improve) and as such expect to increase future
consumption. The increase in postspill ex-
pected demand relative to actual demand in-
creases per-person, per-meal welfare by
$2.02, and annual aggregate welfare by $0.9
million.
Again, we observe long-run behavioral dif-
ferences across subgroups. Once more, Class
3 consumers are nonresponsive to the spill
over a longer-term horizon. For Class 2 con-
sumers, RP2 and SP2 estimates are not statis-
tically different from zero, so we do not ob-
serve any long-term rebound in demand.
Instead, the short-term fall in demand persists
18 This can perhaps be viewed as a lower-bound estimate
of welfare losses, as the second survey was conducted 8
months following the spill. As such, 4 months of the RP2
counts were consumed prior to the spill.
19 A Wald test (W = –0.045 with probability
value = 0.00) indicates that the difference between prespill
and postspill expected meals (SP1 and SP2) is statistically
different from zero.
over a longer-term horizon with no statisti-
cally significant increases in welfare. For
Class 1 and 4 consumers, we also do not ob-
serve any long-term changes in behavior after
the spill, so the positive spill impacts continue
into the future.
Finally, at the time of the survey a partial
ban on harvesting oysters was in place for
Louisiana oyster beds. The final SP question
in the postspill survey asked respondents to
state any change in expected behavior in re-
sponse to a randomly assigned continuation of
the ban. In estimation we code the ban vari-
able (BAN_DIFF) as the difference between
individuals’ expected length of the ban
(BAN_LENGTH) and the stated length of the
ban (BAN). As such, BAN_DIFF captures the
difference between individuals’ expected and
actual ban length. The negative and highly
significant coefficient on the BAN_DIFF vari-
able indicates that the longer the period be-
tween respondents’ expectations regarding
the length of the ban and its actual duration
significantly reduces oyster consumption. In
the literature, the effect of a harvesting ban is
typically captured by examining how con-
sumption behavior changes to news of a ban
at a single point in time (Swartz and Strand
1981; Smith, van Ravenswaay, and Thomp-
son 1988; Wessells, Miller, and Brooks 1995).
We also ran the model using a simple dummy
variable equal to 1 when stated preference
counts were elicited under the ban scenario.20
The ban coefficient was not statistically sig-
nificant. Combined, these findings provide
some additional insight into consumers’ re-
action to a harvesting ban by illustrating that
consumers’ responses to a ban can’t necessar-
ily be represented by a binary variable (i.e.,
they are responsive only to a ban or no ban
scenario), but rather, that the length of the ban
relative to expectations can be influential.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This research takes advantage of a unique
dataset of oyster consumer behavior to ana-
lyze the impact of the BP Deepwater Horizon
20 A Wald test (W = 0.05 with probability value = 0.00)
indicates that the difference between postspill actual (RP2)
and expected (SP2) meals is statistically different from zero.
oil spill on consumer demand. Using a repeat
sample of oyster consumer behavior imme-
diately before and approximately 8 months
following the spill, we develop an RP/SP
model that extends the findings of other re-
search in this area by enabling both the short-
term and longer-term impacts of the spill on
oyster demand to be analyzed.
Results show that, as expected, the BP spill
significantly reduced demand for oysters in
the months following the spill. This short-
term reaction is in line with several other stud-
ies looking at health scare demand effects
(Swartz and Strand 1981; Smith, van Raven-
swaay, and Thompson 1988; Brown and
Schrader 1990; Parsons et al. 2006). However,
while studies using market-based data typi-
cally demonstrate that decreases in demand
return to their baseline level after 1 to 2
months, our results indicate that 8 months af-
ter the spill, demand remained below prespill
levels, so welfare losses persisted. Further,
while studies using stated preference methods
constrain demand impacts and welfare mea-
sures to one point in time following the event,
our pre- and postspill survey framework en-
ables an investigation of the effects of the spill
on expected behavior over a longer-term ho-
rizon. For the average respondent, 8 months
after the spill, the negative spill effects dissi-
pate and we observe demand starting to pick
up again, although expected demand still re-
mains below prespill levels.
While the standard RP/SP model assumes
a homogenous mean influence of the spill and
other explanatory variables across sampled
oyster consumers, we also incorporate unob-
served heterogeneity into the RP/SP frame-
work by estimating a latent class model. The
latent class model provides a deeper analysis
into consumers’ behavioral responses to the
spill by investigating whether the short- and
longer-term behavioral impacts vary across
classes of consumer. In a four-class latent
class model, results show that for one group
of consumers, short-term responses to the spill
are in line with those of the average consumer.
Conversely, two other groups respond to news
of the spill by increasing demand. We recon-
cile this result by suggesting that these groups
perhaps exhibits less risk-averse behavior, a
notion that is supported by at-risk consumers
TABLE A1
Postspill Price Changes
Variable Label Mean Coeff. Std. Err. t-Stat.
Intercept 3.035 0.2790 10.88
Pounds Landings in 1,000s 415 0.00012 0.000099 1.20
October = 1 if October 0.094 0.335 0.1459 2.30
Alabama = 1 if Alabama 0.094 0.750 0.5023 1.49
Florida = 1 if Florida 0.26 −0.690 0.4953 −1.39
Year 2009 = 1 if 2009 0.33 0.0367 0.1390 0.26
BP×2010 = 1 if postspill in 2010 0.21 0.527 0.1517 3.47
Year 2011 = 1 if 2011 0.33 0.0984 0.1394 0.71
Note: Dependent variable = Real oyster ex-vessel price/lb (mean = $3.17). N = 138.
in the group consuming more oyster meals.
For all three groups, time does not mitigate
their response behavior, as their responses
continue 8 months after the event. As such,
the negative/positive impacts are also felt in
the longer term.
APPENDIX: POSTSPILL PRICE
ESTIMATION
Our approach to obtaining baseline price data be-
fore and after the spill was to develop a model of
Eastern oyster ex-vessel prices: xp = α+βQ +γS +
; where xp is the ex-vessel price per pound,δM +θBP
Q is pounds landed, S is a vector of dummy variables
for the state, M is the month, Y is the year, and BP is
a dummy variable equal to 1 during months when the
oil spill affected the oyster harvest (we used May–
December 2010). A positive and significant coeffi-
cient for indicates that the BP oil spill caused aθ
supply shock that increased oyster prices.
Assuming that the price of an Eastern oyster meal
in a state is proportional to the ex-vessel price, we
added the survey-induced price change to the ex-ves-
sel price (with a wholesale-to-retail markup estimate
from the National Marines Fisheries Service) to con-
struct a state-level price variable before and after the
oil spill. Ex-vessel price data were adjusted for infla-
tion using the Food and Agriculture Organization’s
fish (producer) price index for the United States from
2009 to 2011 (Tveterås et al. 2012).
We operationalized the above model with Gulf of
Mexico landings data from the National Marine Fish-
eries Service and estimated a random effects panel
data model (Wansbeek and Kapteyn Variance Com-
ponents). Given the large number of independent vari-
ables, we dropped variables with a t-statistic less than
1 (this had no effect on the BP effect coefficient). The
results are in Table A1.
This model indicates that oyster prices rose by
$0.53 following the BP oil spill in 2010. Prices fell
back to prespill 2010 levels in 2011. Evaluating each
coefficient at the mean of the variable, the nonspill
oyster price is $3.05 and the spill price is $3.58. We
consider markup factors at the primary wholesale and
processing level (82.3%), the secondary wholesale
and processing level, and either retail trade from
stores (33.4%) or retail trade from food service
(182.4%). The total markup from harvest to consumer
expenditures, ignoring value added, is 771%. There-
fore, at the retail level the $0.53/lb. price difference
would lead to a $4.09 price increase.
In our postspill models we examined the sensitivity
of results to this additional price increase: fp =spill
. Given that most oysterbp + dp + dprandom BPspill
meals involve less than a pound of meat, we estimated
the models with $1, $2, $3, and $4 values for
(rounding down from $4.09). We conducteddpBPspill
sensitivity analysis with the price increase and found
that our results are not sensitive to this difference.
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